

QUICK READ SYNOPSIS

Terrorism: What the Next President Will Face

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Volume 618, July 2008

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DOI: 10.1177/0002716208320129

Al Qaeda, the Organization: A Five-Year Forecast

Peter Bergen

Background

While al Qaeda is not strong enough to launch an attack inside the United States in the next five years, it will continue to train militants for successful attacks in Europe.

- Al Qaeda's leadership is likely to remain in place for years, and it is unlikely to lose its safe haven on the Afghan-Pakistan border in the near term, although it has suffered real reverses in Iraq.
- Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups will, in the long term, implode because of their unrestrained violence against fellow Muslims and lack of a real plan for governance.

Al Qaeda Propaganda

The first major production of al Qaeda's propaganda arm, As Sahab, debuted on the Internet signaling a major anti-American attack in the works in 2001.

- In 2007 al Qaeda released at least eighty audio- and videotapes, more than in any other year in its six-year history.
- Bin Laden says 90 percent of his battle is conducted in the media.
- Bin Laden remains in broad ideological and strategic control of al Qaeda around the world.
- To the extent that al Qaeda has a new base, it is in Pakistan, from which bin Laden has released a stream of audiotapes and videotapes.

- Pakistan* In Pakistan, al Qaeda has also been able to deepen its cooperation with Kashmiri militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.
- The Pakistani military and its intelligence agency the ISI (Interservices Intelligence Directorate) have proven unwilling or incapable of destroying al Qaeda and its Taliban allies.
 - The Taliban have increasingly adopted both al Qaeda tactics and ideology and could thus provide al Qaeda with a political constituency.
- European Militants* The Islamist terrorist threat to the United States today largely emanates from Europe, not from domestic sleeper cells or the graduates of Middle Eastern *madrassas*.
- Citizens of the European Union who adopt al Qaeda's ideology can easily move around Europe and have easy visa entry into the United States.
 - The most likely perpetrators of another major terrorist attack on American soil come from militant British citizens of Pakistani descent.
 - Many terrorists are either immigrants to the West or second-generation Muslims who have not integrated into their host countries.
 - The Iraq War has increased radicalization in the Muslim world and provided al Qaeda with more recruits than it would otherwise have had, and they will find new targets around the world.
- Iraq Withdrawal* U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would be a boon to al Qaeda because of the intensification in the civil war that would probably result.
- Shiite militias will intensify their attacks on Sunnis in mixed areas; Iraqi Sunnis will be more likely to turn to al Qaeda to defend them.
 - The one important caveat is that al Qaeda's ability to gain control of territory or achieve even a minstate in Iraq will be limited by the disregard of civilizational norms by its recruits.
- The Future* The shift in tactics to attacks on Western economic and business targets is resulting from the hardening of military targets.
- Disrupting Western economies and, by extension the global economy, is useful for al Qaeda's wider jihad.
 - Strategists expect al Qaeda to attack Israeli/Jewish targets.
 - Al Qaeda is increasingly likely to deploy female suicide bombers.
 - Al Qaeda will continue to use the Internet to spread jihad.
 - They will attempt to use RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades) or SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) to bring down commercial jetliners.
 - We can expect them to try to deploy a radiological attack and some use of chemical and biological weapons.
- Al Qaeda Strategy* The most important strategic goal of al Qaeda is to seize control of a state, or part of a state, somewhere in the Muslim world.
- Such a jihadist state would then become a launching pad for attacks on the American homeland.
 - Another key goal will be to maintain their base on the Afghan-Pakistan border, seeking a safe haven that replicates some of the features of its Afghan haven before the fall of the Taliban.
 - Al Qaeda's aim in the next five years will be to stay relevant and to stay in the news.

*Attack on the
United States*

It is a low-level probability that al Qaeda will be able to attack the United States in the next five years, although that prediction may change once the war(s) in Iraq winds down and militant veterans seek other battle fronts.

- The United States is a more impenetrable target than it was before 9/11.
- The ability of a terrorist to enter the country and mount a successful operation has been diminished by government actions, the awareness of the American public, and the weaker state of al Qaeda itself.
- One area of concern is American citizens of Pakistani descent traveling back home to Pakistan to acquire training and direction from al Qaeda as the London bombers did before the July 7, 2005, attacks.

Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm

Bruce Riedel

Background

This century's nightmares come together in Pakistan: nuclear proliferation, drug smuggling, military dictatorship, and above all, international terrorism.

- The next American president must move Pakistan away from being a hot-house of terror.
- The military will remain a critical player in Pakistan and call the shots on terrorism.
- Coming to grips with Pakistan's obsession with India and with Kashmir is critical.

*The Pakistani
View of the
United States*

Many if not most Pakistanis believe the United States used their country in the 1980s to defeat the Soviet Union and then callously betrayed its ally.

- In the summer of 1990, just when the war against the Soviets was ending, the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear weapons program.
- This action led to the end of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan.
- Many Pakistanis noted that the CIA could have made this judgment at any time in the past decade and only made it when the United States no longer needed Pakistan's help in the Afghan war.

The Taliban

The Taliban's rise was the response to the civil war that followed among the *mujahedin* parties.

- It arose in the southern Pashtun provinces of the country led by a much wounded veteran of the jihad against the Soviets, Mullah Omar.
- Pakistanis saw in the Taliban a mechanism to end the civil war and consolidate their influence over Afghanistan through a proxy.
- In the 1990s Pakistan moved to support Kashmir in the dispute with India and to try to gain control over the revolt.
 - Pakistani-sponsored terrorists took the battle outside the province and into India.
 - Despite repeated promises, Pakistan has not broken its links to these Kashmiri groups.

Bin Laden

In late 1999 the connections between bin Laden, al Qaeda, the Kashmiris, the Taliban, and the Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI) were dramatically illustrated in the hijacking of an Indian airliner from Katmandu.

- The Katmandu ISI station assisted the hijackers in gaining access to weapons in the airport.
- The flight was diverted to Kandahar where the Taliban protected the hijackers and negotiated with the Indian authorities.
 - Osama bin Laden was on the ground as well, even hosting the victory dinner when the hijackers got their demands met.
- Some Pakistanis insist that bin Laden's connection with the ISI went beyond support for mutual causes in Afghanistan and Kashmir and extended into meddling in internal Pakistani politics.

Lessons Learned

Aside from the liberation of Kabul, America's efforts to persuade Pakistan to take decisive action to control the Taliban, Kashmiri terrorists, and al Qaeda have largely been failures.

- The record shows that the United States and its global allies have made repeated efforts to encourage Pakistan to act responsibly but have had only limited and temporary success.
- The record demonstrates that Washington has employed a full range of options in working the Pakistani case, from sanctions to rewards, from unilateralism to multilateralism, and from jawboning to threats.
 - The next president should use all of these levers, as appropriate, but he or she must do something much more inventive to break Pakistan's unhealthy relationship with terror.
- The United States must recognize that central to Pakistan's policy calculations throughout have been security concerns about India.
 - The army has defined the jihadist nexus as a critical force multiplier, necessary to confront India.
 - This network includes more than fifty Pakistan-based radical groups who share deep bonds of an Islamic ideology.
- To make matters worse, the Pakistani army has a very deep distrust of the United States, which is seen as a fair-weather friend.

NOTE: Washington and New Delhi are drawing increasingly closer, and Pakistan feels even more deeply threatened by the rise of India.

Opportunity

A unique opportunity for quiet American diplomacy to help advance the Kashmir issue to reach a better, more stable solution may exist in 2009.

- The U.S.–India nuclear deal should create a more stable and enduring basis for U.S.–Indian relations than at any time in history.
- The deal removes the central obstacle to closer strategic ties between Washington and New Delhi, the nuclear proliferation problem, which has held back the development of their relationship for two decades.
- In the new era of U.S.–Indian strategic partnership, Washington should be more prepared to press New Delhi to be more flexible on Kashmir.
- Resolution of the Kashmiri issue would go a long way to making Pakistan a more normal state, less preoccupied with India.

NOTE: The next president must adopt a more sophisticated approach to Pakistan and its terror nexus that goes beyond threats and sanctions, beyond commando raids and intelligence cooperation, beyond aid and aircraft sales.

Using the Mistakes of al Qaeda's Franchises to Undermine Its Strategies

Brian Fishman

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Background Since the invasion of Iraq, al Qaeda has used “franchises” to expand its global reach.

- Al Qaeda offered these franchises very little, except its name, reputation, and ideology.
- The United States should use al Qaeda's franchises as a vehicle to attack al Qaeda's name, reputation, and ideas.
- Al Qaeda's franchises' many errors should be used as the cornerstone of a narrative to highlight al Qaeda's ideological failings.
- In Iraq, three mistakes in particular offer opportunities to undermine al Qaeda's ideology: attacks against Muslim civilians, the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq, and infighting with other insurgent groups.

Strategy The U.S. strategy should be to compellingly link military operations and mass communications in a strategic narrative to discredit al Qaeda.

- To be effective, that narrative must be grounded in hard facts, not rhetoric (accurate, empty, or otherwise).
- Al Qaeda has been careful to avoid operational blunders, but it should be held to account for the indiscretions of its less careful affiliates, especially in Iraq.

The Three Issues The explanations of the three issues in particular that offer opportunities to undermine al Qaeda's ideology are as follows:

- *Attacks on civilians*—Al Qaeda in Iraq's attacks on Muslim civilians have been operationally successful but strategically disastrous because they alienate far more potential supporters than they attract.
- *Declaring the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)*—To redefine its organization in Iraq, al Qaeda declared the ISI.
 - Al Qaeda demanded the allegiance of all Sunnis in Western Iraq, but the ISI's problem is that it has two core constituencies with widely divergent demands: Iraqi Sunnis living under the ISI's “jurisdiction” want security and basic services, and al Qaeda ideologues outside of Iraq want the ISI to demonstrate “Islamic” governance as they conceive of it.
- *Infighting with Iraqi Sunnis*—the ISI believes establishing *sharia* (Islamic law based on the Koran) is more important than providing security and services, which clearly subsumes the practical concerns of Iraqis to the demands of religious orthodoxy as al Qaeda sees it.
 - Tension came to a head with a disagreement over control of territory. Everyday Iraqis probably would have liked to see al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)/ISI cooperate with other Sunni groups.
 - To achieve its goals, the ISI went about its mission by using violence against other Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq.

Recommendations The next U.S. president should learn several lessons from the past so that the United States is better positioned to take advantage of strategic opportunities.

- Build a strategic message, wait patiently, capitalize on opportunities.
- Magnify debates among enemies.

- Choose the right enemies.
 - By publicly identifying which groups America considers dangerous, the United States can influence which insurgents have the most credibility to claim victory.
- Conceive of operations comprehensively.
 - Planners must learn to think through communications contingencies just as they do logistical and military ones.

Iraq's Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism

Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack

Background

From a counterterrorism perspective, two things make America's policy predicament in Iraq difficult:

- First, the United States and its Iraqi allies have achieved impressive successes against al Qaeda in Iraq in the last year.
- Second, the problem of terrorism emanating from Iraq does not go away if the United States abandons the country to strife.

NOTE: This article looks at Iraq from a counterterrorism perspective, with a particular emphasis on the implications of a return to the levels of chaos comparable to 2006 (or worse) as would likely be the case if the United States were to precipitously withdraw from Iraq without leaving behind a stable security and political situation.

Salafi Extremists

Since the U.S. occupation of Iraq began in 2003, foreign-born *Salafi* extremists have flocked to Iraq, making it a new center of their jihad. In the process, they have transformed the nature of the anti-U.S. Iraqi resistance.

- The Iraq conflict has become the "cause célèbre" for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world.
- Now the number of Iraqi-born Salafi terrorists has swelled.

NOTE: Coalition gains against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Salafi groups came by convincing a great many of the Sunnis that once provided the vast bulk of the manpower for the Sunni insurgency to switch sides and turn against the Salafi jihadists.

The New Jihad

Iraq has fostered a new brand of jihad, providing a place where budding Salafi insurgents gain combat experience and forge lasting bonds that will enable them to work together in the years to come, even if they leave Iraq.

- The immediate goals of AQI are to dominate the Sunni community and drive a wedge between the U.S. Army and its local allies.

- AQI would then launch the second part of its plan wherein Iraq would serve as base for attacking neighbors.

NOTE: At present, in light of recent setbacks that AQI has suffered, its new objectives are simply survival and, if possible, reestablishing the strong position it enjoyed in 2006; however, a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would provide the group with more room to mobilize.

*Withdrawal
Consequences*

Though leaving creates additional problems for other U.S. objectives, from the counterterrorism perspective, the case for leaving Iraq appears strong on the surface.

- Muslims who object to the U.S. occupation of one of the historic centers of the Muslim world would be appeased.
- Resources devoted to Iraq could be used to fight bin Laden and affiliated jihadists in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere.
- The constant irritation in the relationship between the United States and its European allies would be removed.

*Withdrawal's
Long-Term
Consequences
Involve Setbacks
for
Counterterrorism*

Unfortunately, a likely scenario for Iraq in the event of a near-term American withdrawal is chaos and all-out civil war.

- Al Qaeda and like-minded extremists would tout U.S. withdrawal as a victory.
- Foreign terrorists would also declare victory and declare that if you push the United States it will fold.
- If the situation returns to its 2006 nadir, Iraq could be a new terrorist haven comparable to or perhaps exceeding prewar Afghanistan.
- New, more capable fighters, who can easily enter the United States, will arise with training in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and an ethos that glorifies suicide bombing.

Containment

A limited number of U.S. forces will have to remain in and/or near Iraq devoted to problems of assisting refugees, preventing neighboring states from massively intervening, and otherwise trying to stop further disaster.

- One of the most important tasks for the United States is to limit the ability of terrorists to use Iraq as a haven for attacks outside the country.
- The goal would be to stop parts of Iraq from becoming terrorist centers on the scale of the Taliban's Afghanistan.
- However, this approach does not remove the U.S. military presence.

Conclusion

Beyond military actions, the United States must work hard to increase the governmental capacity of neighboring states.

- The flow of refugees is one particular concern, as refugees who are not assimilated or well policed may carry conflict with them.
- In addition, the bored and uprooted young men in the refugee camps are prime recruits for terrorist groups.
- Strengthening military and intelligence training programs for neighboring countries is essential so that they can better manage any unrest that occurs in their countries.
- A diplomatic priority should be to discourage Iraq's neighbors from meddling in Iraq, particularly on behalf of the Salafi extremists.
- Finally, the United States will have to recognize the limits of what can be accomplished.

Briefing for the New President: The Terrorist Threat in Indonesia and Southeast Asia

Sidney Jones

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- Background* Southeast Asia holds many encouraging signs on the counterterrorism front, particularly in Indonesia, where the short-term likelihood of another suicide bombing aimed at Western targets appears low.
- Long-term prospects are more worrying because jihadi ideology has spread beyond the groups known to have used violence.
 - The jihadi movement in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, is dynamic, always evolving, adapting, and mutating.
 - The biggest danger may lie in emergent groups able to draw on dissatisfied members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other jihadi networks.
- Jemaah Islamiyah* JI retains a structure with at least nine hundred inducted members and likely more across Indonesia with other individual members, largely cut off from the structure, in Malaysia and the Philippines.
- Its leadership still draws heavily on those trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
 - More problematic are the Mindanao-trained cadres who fought in Ambon and Poso.
 - JI has weapons caches, but the firearms and bombs found in 2007 were sealed in a concrete bunker and not planned for immediate use.
- JI Funding* No significant external funding has come into JI since 2003, when a cell in Karachi arranged a transfer through al Qaeda contacts.
- JI members arrested in March 2007 said the major source of funding was *infaq*, or contributions from members.
 - Larger donations come from sympathetic local businesses, some of them run by JI members. One major expense is support of families of detained members.
- Training* A few Indonesians are still reaching Mindanao for training but on a very sporadic basis.
- The reemergence of a regional jihadi training center would be a source of grave concern, but for the moment there are none.
 - The place to watch is the border area of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
 - What happens inside prison, in terms of recruiting ordinary criminals and prison guards and dissemination of jihadi ideology, is critical, as is what happens after release.
- Targets* Most of the jihadi groups in Indonesia are more focused on local Christians and *thaghut* (anti-Islamic) officials as enemies than on the United States and foreign targets.
- They do see the United States as leader of the international Crusader-Zionist alliance and ultimately responsible for persecution of Muslims around the world.
 - They see Jews and Christians as natural enemies of Islam.

Policy

NOTE: While the best-known jihadi groups are in a state of some disarray, efforts appear to be under way to organize new ones, in a way that could have repercussions a few years hence.

In general, a new U.S. president should downplay the importance of counterterrorism in U.S. policy without cutting back on the level of support.

- That said, U.S. counterterrorism assistance in Indonesia, focused on increasing the capacity of police and courts to investigate and prosecute terrorism, has been effective and should be continued.
- An audit and evaluation of all counterterrorism assistance is in order to see what elements worked better than others and where wastage occurred.
- A new administration could help develop better information sharing between South and Southeast Asia, through supporting exchange programs of police and intelligence officers and relevant government agencies and strengthening understanding of South Asian militant Islamic networks and their linkages to Southeast Asia.
- For Indonesia, U.S. assistance designed to monitor and effectively address communal tensions across the country would be useful.
- In some key areas, aid is needed, but the United States is poorly placed to assist: prison reform is one example.

From Profiles to *Pathways* and Roots to *Routes*: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism

John Horgan

Background

The reasons people get involved in terrorism may have little bearing on what they do (or are permitted to do) as terrorists, or how they actually become engaged in specific terrorist operations. Why this is, is an important point in forming response strategies to terrorism.

- Unless we make these distinctions explicit, we may be trying to force a simple answer about routes to, through, and away from terrorism.
- We need to distinguish between how and why an individual becomes part of an *existing* terrorist movement and how that person becomes part of an effort aimed at creating a *new* terrorist cell or movement.
- Clearer conceptual thinking can also help us to prioritize the questions we need to answer and better focus policy decisions and resources.

Profiles

One of the major challenges is answering the question, How and why does someone become a terrorist?

- No terrorist profile yet exists—the search continues for two reasons:
 - terrorist behavior appears to be abnormal to most people; and
 - relatively speaking, so *few* people actually become terrorists.

- Finding why people join these groups is difficult because of a failure to pay more attention to
 - the gradual nature of the socialization processes into terrorism and the existence of multiple pathways even into the same group,
 - a sense of the supportive qualities associated with recruitment,
 - the sense of migration between roles, and
 - a sense of the importance of role qualities.
- Some predisposing risk factors for involvement have been identified:
 - the presence of some emotional vulnerability,
 - dissatisfaction with their current activity,
 - identification with victims and a kinship with group members,
 - the belief that terrorism is not immoral, and
 - a sense of reward from being accepted into a group.

NOTE: When we assume static qualities of the terrorist (a feature of profiles), we become blind to the qualities of the dynamics that shape and support the development of the terrorist. As a consequence, practical avenues for policy interventions are obscured.

Counterterrorism Given the commonalities of why people become terrorists, what tangible operational strategies can be offered to counterterrorism initiatives?

- We can do little in a practical sense to change the “push” factors (i.e., the broad sociopolitical conditions) that give rise to terrorism.
- Counterterrorism programs may be more effective in concentrating on addressing the “pull” factors (or “lures”), since they tend to be narrower, more easily identifiable, and specific to particular groups and contexts.
- Even on a basic level, we cannot overestimate the significance of the media in undermining the positive attractions (particularly the sense of nobility) that involvement in terrorism is deemed to hold for recruits.
- Counterterrorism (or counterpropaganda) initiatives must identify what will be most credible for communicating countermessages—the messages may have a real impact at the initial stages of involvement.

Conclusions

We may yet discover that even the beliefs of deeply committed extremists may be more subject to change than we previously expected.

- It is worth exploring the role of the individual as a “consumer of propaganda,” particularly in the context of a conflict.
- We need to understand the major function of terrorist leaders to encourage changes in political and religious beliefs.
- A major objective should be to publicize the negative consequences of involvement in terrorism, challenge its legitimacy through the appropriate channels, undermine the “brand” and imagery associated with involvement, and encourage a displacement of activity that would otherwise result in greater involvement in a terrorist movement.
- Profiling the individual and his or her presumed associated qualities has no future in serious analyses of either the terrorist or the pathways to radicalization in which he or she engages.
 - We ought to consider instead profiling the *process* of violent radicalization and the meaning of engagement with that process to the individual terrorist.

- The disengagement phase remains the most poorly understood and least researched, but ironically, it is in this phase that practical counterterrorism initiatives—aimed not only at facilitation of disengagement but also at prevention of initial involvement—might actually become very effective.

“Homegrown” Terrorists: Theory and Cases in the War on Terror’s Newest Front

Evan F. Kohlmann

Background

Young men (and, increasingly, women) may have no formal contact with any terrorist organization, but they can become virtual partners of al Qaeda by carefully studying its online knowledge base and executing terrorist attacks.

- Law enforcement investigations have uncovered a surprisingly sophisticated network of budding terrorist “entrepreneurs” lurking in a host of major cities across Europe and North America.
- Indeed, a globalized society now permits international terrorist organizations to dramatically expand their potential reach by courting likeminded individuals in dark corners around the world.
- They are often fanatically loyal to the public orders of al Qaeda military commanders and they are already placed in (and are familiar with) far-off countries that are prime targets for al Qaeda attacks.

NOTE: To confront this looming problem, first we must recognize that the recent flourishing of this trend is the result of consistent, deliberate action taken on the part of al Qaeda, and second we must understand that such hybrid networks pose a real security threat to the United States.

New al Qaeda Message

Al Qaeda recruiters in Europe have radically changed their message.

- Their new philosophy emphasizes the individual nature and responsibility of jihad.
- The Internet offers al Qaeda a safe interface with potential operatives without immediately compromising both the recruits and recruiters (as had happened with cell phones and faxes).
- Al Qaeda commanders use the Internet to incite sympathetic individuals to form homegrown terrorist networks—most notably, with sophisticated, Hollywood-worthy digital video recordings.
 - Recordings explain the nature and goals of the worldwide jihad against America.
 - Videos by al Qaeda in Iraq focused heavily on planning phases and the preexecution rituals for “martyrs-in-waiting.”
- Evidence suggests that this material has indeed reached the proper market and significantly shapes the actions of its intended audience.

*Terrorist
Entrepreneurs*

Law enforcement investigations around the world have uncovered a surprisingly sophisticated network of budding young terrorist “entrepreneurs” lurking in a host of major cities across Europe and North America.

- At the center of this extended network was a mysterious personality who “seemed to exist only in cyberspace,” known as “Irhaby 007.”
- Over the space of two years, the mysterious Irhaby 007 gradually fashioned a role for himself as the premier Internet facilitator for a host of al Qaeda terrorist commanders.
- The relationship between al Qaeda’s network in Iraq and Irhaby 007 grew to the point when in 2005 it became obvious the two were in regular communication with each other over more discreet channels.
- Given Irhaby 007’s obviously impressive terrorist contacts, one might think he was a veteran of the Afghan training camps, or a lieutenant to Osama bin Laden, but when found he turned out to be a goofy-looking, long-haired, twenty-two-year-old student named Younis Tsouli.
 - Not the typical terrorist, he had come to the United Kingdom with his family from Morocco in 2001. His father works as the deputy head of Morocco’s tourism office in London
 - Ironically, Tsouli’s identity was compromised through his careless use of cellular telephones.
- Tsouli’s entrepreneurial terrorist network was able to extend into Canada—where it became interlinked with a homegrown cell of native Canadian nationals who were aspiring militants known as the “Toronto 17.”

Clear Guidance

Canadian authorities had first taken an investigative interest in the two Toronto 17 cell ringleaders principally “because of their posts” on a radical Web chat forum known as “Clear Guidance.”

- Clearguidance.com was initially founded by a twenty-three-year-old resident of Houston, Texas: Pakistani-American Sarfaraz Jamal.
- After it was closed down, Jamal reinstated the project under the name The Islamic Network, which was used to republish countless English-language translations of propaganda and instructional documentation originally released by al Qaeda and other terrorists.

Conclusions

Some observers have wrongly interpreted the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism and al Qaeda’s efforts to encourage it as proof that al Qaeda supposedly no longer exists as an organization—only as an ideology.

- In attempts to counter homegrown terrorism, workers may have an instinctive desire to strike back against the online systems that serve as recruiting beacons for homegrown terrorists by crudely shutting down Web sites and jamming chat forums with spam.
- While this may succeed in temporarily slowing or even disconnecting the flow of information, the emphasis here is on “temporary.”
- Particular Web sites and chat forums may come and go, but as long as those who sponsor them, administer them, and populate them are allowed to proliferate, there will always be a problem with “homegrown” terrorism on the Internet.

Countering Terrorist Finance: A Work, Mostly in Progress

Jonathan M. Winer

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Background

Funds still reach terrorist groups through state sponsors, charities, and criminal activities.

- In principle, if we are ever to have adequate controls in place to “detect” terrorist finance and to “disrupt” the activities of terrorist financiers, it should by now have been built, but it has not.
- Failures of internal coordination, external communication, external institution building, and flagging energy need to be addressed by the new U.S. administration regardless of party.

State Sponsorship

Historically, the United States had focused primarily on state sponsorship: when a country intentionally provides direct support for terrorist groups.

- Maybe the failure by the United States to call a “spade” a “spade” contributed to permitting support for al Qaeda to develop in otherwise “friendly” countries.
- There should be no question that the equivalent of state sponsorship of al Qaeda did play a material factor in financing that organization and that controls on such financing used to be nonexistent.

Charities

Terrorist groups have long exploited charities that provide social services such as education, health care, and religious instruction as mechanisms to generate support for their causes and to propagate extremist ideologies.

- Terrorists use the charities to attract large numbers of unwitting donors along with the witting, to increase public support, to discourage government action against them, and to operate in areas of conflict where the terrorists otherwise would have no cover.
- *Example:* Funds for Hamas have come from many sources—including through online appeals to American Muslims by the Holy Land Foundation in the United States as well as a wide array of other charities operating in Europe and the Middle East.
- Since 9/11, the United States has designated seventy-two charities and related individuals worldwide as supporters of terrorism, including the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation and the Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), al Qaida-linked charities that were operating in the United States.
- The ability of such charities to deliver real assistance at a time when local governments are dysfunctional provides immediate and long-term opportunities for recruiting for later terrorist activity.

Self-Funders

Many terrorist groups become self-funding, typically by engaging in criminal activity, often in collusion with criminal groups.

- The link between the illicit production of narcotics and terrorist groups is pervasive and recurrent, as is tobacco smuggling.
- Other terrorists finance themselves with small-scale criminal activity.

The Next Steps

Despite the substantial effort by the United States and its peers to build a global system to combat terrorist finance, a new administration will have much work to do to sustain the existing progress on terrorist finance issues.

- Profound political problems still need to be addressed to ensure global cooperation against terrorist threats.
- The United States needs to complete the work begun on replacing charities with alternative sources for social services.
- U.S. law enforcement needs to continue its two-decades-old migration, becoming not merely cross-border but global.
- The United States needs to complete on its own the regulation of all financial sectors required of it by the Patriot Act and to finish the job of issuing regulations on hedge funds and any other uncovered sectors.
- Further strategies need to be developed to address bulk currency smuggling, gold, diamonds, and other high-value commodities capable of readily holding and transferring stored value.
- The United States should consider whether United Nations activities against terrorism can be reinigorated and supplemented with mechanisms to address EU civil rights concerns.
- The United States needs to make its own enforcement activities more visibly effective, as well as its communications about terrorist finance to its own public and the world.

The Incisive Fight: Recommendations for Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence

Eric Rosenbach

Background

On the strategic level, counterterrorism intelligence policy has been muddled during the past eight years.

- The next president should cast aside political ideology and build on reform efforts to empower top-notch leaders.
- Strong new leaders in the intelligence community must energize the National Counterterrorism Center and provide the president with comprehensive and policy-relevant intelligence analysis.
- The next president must boost cooperation with liaison security services from other countries.
- The intelligence community must bolster its operational capacity to find and detain terrorists around the world.

Leadership

Effective leaders with strong initiative are crucial to success.

- The administration should select and empower top-notch leaders in the intelligence community.
- The next president should resist the temptation to reorganize the intelligence community.

Energize the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)

The next president should ensure that a new Director of the NCTC truly drives the effort to protect the nation from terrorist attacks. The director

- must draft a coherent national counterterrorism strategy that reflects operational reality, not political talking points;

*Analytic
Excellence*

- should solve the rift with the CIA and improve interagency cooperation to create a joint counterterrorism effort; and
- should make it a priority to ensure that the NCTC becomes the true “center of gravity” for national counterterrorism.

The next president needs to ensure that the intelligence community improves its ability to provide high-quality strategic intelligence to policy makers and national consumers.

- The production of high-quality analytic product requires more than simply access to information, and the current analytic capacity at NCTC is relatively weak.
- Intelligence officers and analysts need to position themselves in environments that will allow them to gather important information—even if it requires more risk.

Smart Alliances

The next president should recognize that preventing Islamic militants from attacking the homeland will require strengthening our working relationships with other nations’ intelligence and national security services.

- We need to increase bilateral cooperation.
- The United States should also look to build on national-level liaison relationships by providing frameworks for regional cooperation.

*Bolster
Operational
Capacity*

The ultimate goal of all counterterrorism intelligence efforts is to prevent an attack on the United States and its allies.

- Unless it is backed with specialized operational capabilities, intelligence that provides details about the location and plans of terrorists plotting an attack is worthless.
- The next president needs to ensure that the National Security Agency continues to effectively and legally provide excellent intelligence.
- The administration needs to develop new aerial vehicles that provide the United States with the ability to conduct persistent, detailed surveillance of terrorists located in the most remote parts of the world.
- The United States must not only establish a new paradigm for finding and fixing terrorists, but also a new strategy for finishing them.
 - The use of force should be *incisive*—highly targeted, limited in scope, and dramatic in effect.

Restoring Moral Authority: Ending Torture, Secret Detention, and the Prison at Guantanamo Bay

Tom Malinowski

Background

The current administration chose to divorce the antiterror struggle from the values and norms the United States has long championed, which has diminished America’s moral standing and influence in the world.

- We have handed America’s enemies a victory they could never have achieved on their own.

- Considering morality and strategy, the next president should issue an executive order that categorically forbids torture, ends the use of secret detention, closes the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, and seeks to release or transfer to home countries detainees who cannot be prosecuted by the United States.
- The key to beating al Qaeda lies in convincing ordinary people in the Muslim world that U.S. values and vision for the future are more attractive than those of its enemies.

*Interrogation
Methods*

The White House authorized the CIA to use interrogation methods that the United States has long considered to be torture against captives.

NOTE: These methods were developed by studying the practices of past U.S. enemies, including the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and the Viet Cong. The administration assumed that immoral practices could be kept secret, but military leaders and civilian officials troubled by the administration's policies began leaking legal memos that authorized cruel treatment.

Torture Control

A future executive order on torture should end the use of secret, incommunicado detention and guarantee the International Committee for the Red Cross access to all prisoners in U.S. custody.

- If torture and cruel treatment are ruled out, there will be no reason to hide prisoners from the Red Cross.
- It is not in the U.S. interest to set a precedent that other governments could use to hold in secret any American they consider a threat.
- Such an order should place strict limits on the movement of detainees to third countries.

Detainees

Some have urged Congress to adopt an administrative detention law permitting detainees to be held without trial but with more due process than they have received at Guantanamo.

- Such a law, however, would be a radical departure from more than two hundred years of legal practice in the United States.
- It could set a dangerous precedent for countries like Egypt, Russia, and China, where the United States has long opposed the use of detention without trial to deal with security threats.
- It would create yet another new and untested system for dealing with detainees, which could look to the world like little more than an extension of Guantanamo to U.S. soil.

NOTE: Treating terrorists as criminals, rather than as combatants entitled to military trials, also helps deny them legitimacy.

*Exposing
Abusers*

A final and particularly sensitive challenge for President Bush's successor will involve not looking forward, but looking backward at the abuses committed by the previous administration.

- Should anyone be punished for these offenses? Can knowledge of what happened simply be buried?
 - It would be unfair for the next administration to punish CIA interrogators for torture if it does not also prosecute the senior officials, including the president, who authorized its use.

- Such a proceeding could divide the country and make it harder to forge a bipartisan consensus stating that what was done to prisoners was wrong.
- At the very least, the next administration should tell the truth about the past. Official recognition would showcase U.S. willingness to deal honestly with its mistakes and its capacity for renewal.

Mutually Assured Support: A Security Doctrine for Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Threats

Baruch Fischhoff, Scott Atran, and Marc Sageman

Background

The leader of any nation attacked with a terrorist nuclear weapon will feel tremendous political pressure to launch a massive response, aimed at the dual goals of preventing additional attacks and bringing the perpetrators to justice.

- A unilateral response may further destabilize the world system, without achieving either of the above goals.
- We must develop an international security doctrine for responding to such calamities.

Today's Terrorists

Today's perpetrators might represent no single nation while terrorizing many nations, which might be implicated for failing to stop them.

- The perpetrators might be domestic, working through Web sites, prisons, or social groups.
- They might create clues implicating innocent countries.
- They might steal materiel from nations with such poor safeguards that its absence goes undetected.
- Public anger at the attack and public fear of another one will require national leaders to take immediate, decisive action.

NOTE: The collateral damage from a misdirected unilateral response to a terrorist attack could evoke international condemnation that undermines support for the attacked nation and reduces its ability to defend and avenge.

The Doctrine

In the event of a nuclear weapon explosion on an attacked nation, participating nations will immediately mobilize, taking extraordinary measures to (1) apprehend and deliver, to the attacked nation, all those involved with the attack; and (2) prevent additional near-term attacks.

- Existing laws of the attacked nation must prevail.
- The attacked nation will not take unilateral action against any nation that fulfills these conditions to its satisfaction.
- A mutually acceptable process will coordinate actions and the evaluation of compliance.

NOTE: For an agreement to hold, the parties must believe that it serves their best interests.

Prior to an Attack

Although bringing perpetrators to justice is important, a nation's primary concern must be preventing attacks with a compelling agreement that helps to disrupt terrorists' plans in three ways:

- ensuring participants' commitment to pursue all those involved in an attack;

- honest information-sharing that could limit terrorists' freedom of action; and
- reducing the threat of attack by encouraging confidence-building measures that reduce a nation's risk of being targeted for retaliation.

After an Attack Should worse come to worst, an attacked nation's first goal will be to prevent further attacks.

- An attack may be seen as having succeeded despite sincere efforts by all participants—if so, then the agreement's focal concern, activating extraordinary measures after an attack, should remain valid.
- The attacked nation must feel able to exercise its power as arbiter of other nations' compliance.
- The agreement will need mechanisms for demonstrating that participants are collecting and sharing evidence, as well as hotly pursuing suspects.

Implementation Two lines of preparatory work are needed to make an agreement feasible.

- One involves embedding it in the fabric of international law, ensuring its compatibility with other agreements.
- The second involves creating the technical monitoring, reporting, and mobilizing mechanisms needed for rapid mobilization.
- Countries whose politics preclude signing an agreement might reach implicit understandings—supported by backchannel communications.

Conclusion Without planning, the response is likely to be spasmodic, ineffective, unilateral retaliation.

- An international agreement embodying the doctrine of mutually assured support would reduce the probability of terrorists exploding nuclear weapons, while making their possession less attractive.
- If worse came to worst, agreements based on the doctrine could still buy leaders the time they need for a measured response and deny terrorists the international schisms that they seek.

The Conundrum of Iran: Strengthening Moderates without Acquiescing to Belligerence

John Brennan

Background The next U.S. president must implement a policy of engagement that encourages moderates in Iran without implying tolerance for Tehran's historic support of terrorist activities.

- This strategy will require patience and sensitivity to the complex political realities inside Iran.
- If the United States actually demonstrates that it will work to help advance rather than thwart Iranian interests, the course of Iranian politics as well as the future of U.S.–Iranian relations could be forever altered.
- The Iranian government must come to terms with the United States, as Washington can effectively stymie Tehran's ability to realize its key political and economic objectives, such as improving its relations with moderate Arab governments and the West and increasing its trade.

*Terrorism
Support*

Iran's proclivity to promote its interests by playing the terrorism card undermines its standing as a responsible sovereign state.

- Notwithstanding current rhetoric, the Iranian theocracy has made much more limited use of terrorism over the past decade than before.
- Now, Iran emphasizes political, financial, and paramilitary support to select proxy clients with agendas that advance Iranian interests—notably Hezbollah and extremist Palestinian groups.
- Iranian materiel support to client groups has allowed Iran to keep the title of “most active state sponsor of terrorism” over the past decade.
- The U.S. challenge is to pursue policies and actions to strengthen and even embolden those Iranians willing to eschew the use of terrorism.

Bush Policy

In 2002 President Bush branded Iran as part of a worldwide “axis of evil” with Iraq and North Korea, which created the perception in Tehran that Washington had embarked on a course of confrontation in the region.

- During his second term, President Bush maintained a hard line on Iran based on Iran's involvement in the violence in Iraq.
- The administration also focused heavy attention on Iranian nuclear activities, including an alleged nuclear weapons program.
- Now, the bellicose volleys coming from the chief spokesmen of both the American and Iranian governments have served to make constructive engagement virtually impossible.

*The Next
Administration*

Iranian officials will carefully scrutinize the words emanating from the next administration to determine whether they reflect a course of continued confrontation, or one of potential accommodation with Tehran.

- The challenge will be to design a policy that has the potential to wean Tehran from its terrorist and other troublemaking activities, rather than one of conciliation that implicitly tolerates their continuance.
- The president must be willing to exercise strategic patience to obtain improved ties and a return of Iran to the community of nations by
 - toning down the rhetoric,
 - having direct dialogue with Tehran,
 - being realistic with respect to Hezbollah, and
 - holding out meaningful carrots as well as sticks.

A Counterradicalization Strategy for a New U.S. Administration

Karin von Hippel

Background

Over the past seven years, polls have shown increasingly negative attitudes toward the United States in the Arab and Muslim world.

- More disturbing still, these critical views are often coupled with sympathy for al Qaeda in its constituency.
- Al Qaeda has been far more effective in the “battle of ideas” than has the United States. Therefore, al Qaeda has grown the movement because it is better at targeting the “enabling environment.”

- Those inhabiting this enabling environment include potential sympathizers, not only in the Arab and Muslim world but also in Europe and North America, who either endorse the platforms of the terrorists or become intimidated into silence.
- Appealing to the enabling environment may be the only way in the long term to isolate terrorists and end terrorism.

Soft Power Tools

If the U.S. government wants to infiltrate, tackle, and tip the enabling environment in a comprehensive manner using “soft power” tools, it should embrace a two-pronged approach for countering radicalization.

- It needs to develop a prioritized development strategy.
- It needs innovative tools and new partners to implement and disseminate that strategy, which should provide
 - support for good governance and anticorruption programs and
 - improvements in social service provision.

NOTE: Most Western donors recognize the importance of good governance, accountability, and social service provision for reducing support for terrorism and have dedicated some of their programming to achieve these goals, but they are not using appropriate tools.

Youth

An emphasis on youth should focus on better ways to educate and engage tomorrow’s leaders, which could include improved public education, university scholarships, employment training, media programs, and after-school extracurricular activities.

Remittance Problem

The U.S. government shuts down remittance houses but rarely attempts to ensure that the families dependent on these financial flows are compensated through other means.

- Ignoring the spillover effect only creates more anti-American sentiment, while new remittance houses spring up in days.
- The goal for change should be threefold:
 - Help money transfer companies become more transparent.
 - Elaborate new ways to facilitate collective remittances for development without undermining local initiative.
 - Improve access to credit for people in fragile and weak states.

User-Driven Innovation

One way of improving social service delivery is by systematically applying new research approaches from management sciences, industry, and Silicon Valley—particularly the focus on “user-driven innovation.”

- Young people are far more adept and less intimidated by new technologies and can serve as mentors to their elders as well as to those currently excluded by the digital divide.
- Donors can encourage children and teens in the United States to mentor their counterparts from the developing world through school twinning and virtual debates, using Web 2.0 tools.
- A user-driven approach requires flexibility, a behind-the-scenes role, and risk-taking, particularly when choosing the new partners.

- One place to start would be in adopting a broader approach to Islamic charities. Western agencies have several reasons to develop better relations with Islamic charities.
- Better communication and information flows can help encourage dialogue with moderate and nonviolent fundamentalist groups.
- In some parts of the world, Islamic NGOs may be the only organizations that are able to work in a conflict zone.

Conclusions

A new counterradicalization strategy needs to be included under the larger issue of U.S. foreign assistance reform.

- Good governance, social service delivery, user-driven approaches, and more appropriate partners are important for improving the lives of all people in developing states, not just for countering radicalization.
- A successful U.S.-led counterradicalization campaign will require a robust communication strategy to ensure that it is understood and disseminated properly.
- Three major messages will need to be broadcast, alongside better programming:
 - *Emphasize global values*—values such as justice, diversity, tolerance, transparency, democracy, charity, community, and human rights are not exclusive to the Western world.
 - *Be flexible and use a mix of tools*—campaigns will require good local knowledge and the use of revolutionary communications concepts, as well as low-tech and no-tech options to improve information sharing and best practices.
 - *Make a commitment*—the strategy needs to be long-term.

The Resurgent and Persistent Threat of al Qaeda

Reid Sawyer and Michael Foster

Background

Al Qaeda has not only survived and sustained its position in the global security environment but has gained a competitive advantage vis-à-vis the United States and its counterterrorism efforts due to two sets of conditions:

- al Qaeda's ability to react, respond, and to some extent shape the security environment; and
- the unwillingness of the United States to recognize the true nature of the threat and a general failure to contest key issues in an effective manner.

New Paradigm

Instead of approaching this conflict as a single war, it must be understood that this conflict is a war of action, a war of networks, and a war of ideas.

- As critical as tactical operations are, it must be remembered it is also a war against regional and global jihadist networks and, perhaps most important, a conflict of ideas and ideologies.
- The initial failure by the United States to recognize these three distinct levels and the subsequent failure to develop a multifaceted counterterrorism strategy to address them has permitted al Qaeda to conduct a global terror campaign on these fronts unabated and largely unchecked.

Al Qaeda's Durability

Despite the fact that most organizations are largely inert and ultimately fail over time, al Qaeda has managed to not only survive but to prosper.

- An effective counterterrorism strategy must explicitly account for al Qaeda's high degree of complexity and its ability to adapt, innovate, and self-organize in the face of a hostile security environment.
- Two elements account for longevity in terrorist organizations:
 - A terrorist organization must possess a minimal set of operational capabilities that permit it to compete in the *current* security environment.
 - It must have an ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure to address rapidly changing environments.

Strategic Imperatives

The authors have identified a set of strategic imperatives.

- Strive to understand the threat.
- Disrupt critical lines of communication.
- Deny sanctuary to al Qaeda senior leadership.
- Deny al Qaeda the ability to merge and create formal alliances with other Salafist groups.
- Aggressively pursue al Qaeda across its myriad of support, logistical, and operational networks.
- Counter al Qaeda's message and ideology as a long-term strategic priority.
- Any strategic efforts to counter al Qaeda's narrative must take into account the conflict in Iraq.

Conclusion

Al Qaeda's durability and its ability to adapt and respond to the challenges it faces presents the United States with a complex, dynamic, and dangerous threat.

- Redefining the war against al Qaeda as three wars will enable the United States to address al Qaeda's operational capabilities in an integrated manner and constrain al Qaeda's ability to adapt, innovate, and reconfigure its assets, thereby limiting its potential for long-term performance.
- Without structuring a strategy that addresses both the strategic as well as the tactical levels of al Qaeda, we will continue to ask ourselves why this organization remains such a formidable opponent.

NOTE: The question remains, though: is the United States willing to do what it takes to bring its capabilities and capacities to bear on the problem? Otherwise, al Qaeda will remain free to do what we fear most.

To Win the "War on Terror," We Must First Win the "War of Ideas": Here's How

Hady Amr and P. W. Singer

Background

This article addresses the critical role of public diplomacy in improving the deteriorating image of the United States in the Muslim world.

- The authors argue that both public diplomacy and policies, including those on civil liberties, are vital to U.S. success in the war on terrorism.

*Shaping the
World's Views*

- Many in the Muslim world believe that the war on terrorism is a war on Islam; this view impedes an effective foreign policy strategy.
- The authors define six principles to improve America's security through winning the war of ideas, including addressing civil liberties concerns and engaging diverse constituencies in the Muslim world.

NOTE: By any measure, America's efforts at communicating with Muslim-majority nations since 9/11 have not been successful.

The success of American foreign policy depends on how the United States can engage with and help shape the views and attitudes held by foreign populations.

- Central to the struggle in the global war of ideas is how the United States deals with issues of civil rights and liberties at home both in general and with particular attention to the American Muslim community.
- In a digitally interconnected world, our behavior in the United States is more closely monitored by citizens around the globe than ever before. We are not faring well.
- In years to come, the world's citizens could either move to being tacit supporters of those who resist America in the form of terrorism or those who embrace America in free trade and political cooperation.

Six Principles

Six broad principles should guide our strategy to improve our security through winning the war of ideas and to broaden and deepen relationships.

- *Confronting who we are*—America must clearly confront its civil liberties concerns at home and in operations abroad to inspire the Muslim world to support our vision of “liberty and justice for all.”
- *Dialogue*—communications efforts should be audience-centered and designed to build dialogue, ensure mutual respect, and forge partnerships.
- *Undertaking outreach*—the United States should engage a varied set of regional players and constituencies.
- *Working toward integration*—diverse U.S. agencies should develop a coordinated, goal-oriented, two-way communications approach.
- *Embracing nimble response*—Strategies and programs should be flexible and responsive to changing events, findings, and trends.
- *Stressing resource investment*—investment should reflect the high strategic priority of the war of ideas to ensuring American security.

U.S. Style

It is time to get back our style.

- Many from the Muslim world say they find the style of communication used by American officials arrogant, patronizing, and needlessly confrontational.
- U.S. leaders should avoid displaying an openly hostile attitude toward the major Muslim world media outlets.

*Winning the
War of Ideas*

The United States can make significant progress toward winning the war of ideas and improving relations with the Muslim world through many interrelated initiatives:

- exerting presidential leadership in civil liberties in general and reducing anti-Muslim bigotry;

- creating an America's Voice Corps and establishing American Centers across the region;
- implementing an American Knowledge Library initiative;
- privatizing Al Hurra and Radio Sawa;
- launching "C-SPANs" for the Muslim world;
- bolstering cultural exchange programs and improving the visa process;
- harnessing U.S. diversity, by engaging Arab and Muslim Americans;
- involving the whole federal bureaucracy in public diplomacy; and
- empowering private citizens and local legislators to build their own productive international linkages.

Opportunity

The next president will have a unique opportunity to personally "reboot" the relationship between the United States and Muslim populations.

- The president should travel to key places in the Muslim world.
- The president could deliver a major policy address outlining goals and a vision of future relations between the United States and the Muslim world.
- The next administration should make efforts to bring the president into personal contact with reform and civil society leaders.
- The president should use the bully pulpit of the presidency to condemn hate speech.

A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists

Marc Sageman

Background

The United States does not have a comprehensive and rational strategy to combat the evolving terrorist threat.

- The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* promotes a political vision of democracy and freedom as an antidote to terrorism that is seen by Muslim populations as an exercise in cynicism.
- The U.S. strategy for combating international Islamist terrorists must be based on an understanding of new terrorists' behavior and the process of radicalization to violence, which for these candidates includes four dimensions:
 - a sense of moral outrage; interpreted in a specific way; which resonates with one's personal experiences; and is channeled through group dynamics, both face-to-face and online.
- The appropriate strategy against this threat is to contain and neutralize the radicalization process along its four dimensions.

"The Enemy"

"The enemy" is a relatively small group of mostly young people, who aspire or belong to a violent social movement that uses violence against civilians for political ends in the name of their version of Islam.

- Traditional Muslims understand the difference between Islam and the claims of the terrorists and point to biased Western reporting as just another instance of this "war against Islam."

- It is this very media image of a “war against Islam” that increases the pool of young Muslims susceptible to the message of the terrorists.
- These young, self-organized new groups are physically isolated but connected through Internet forums, inspired by the extremist ideology, and hoping to be accepted as members of al Qaeda through their terrorist operations.
- The possibility of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) must receive special consideration.
 - Federal experts and local police must coordinate more closely.

The American Dream

The notion of the American Dream, the land of opportunity, partially protects the United States from Islamic terrorism.

- Seventy-one percent of Muslim Americans believe in the American Dream.
- In Europe, Muslims complain about discrimination in the labor market.
- Homegrown terrorism is less likely within the United States than in Europe, although a threat to the U.S. homeland may well still come from Europe.

The European Threat

In Europe, young immigrant cliques and members of student associations and study groups at some radical mosques became radicalized together.

- Natural group dynamics result in a spiral of mutual encouragement and escalation, transforming a few into dedicated terrorists.
- The turn to violence and the terrorist movement is a collective decision, not an individual one.
- The same support and validation that young people used to derive from face-to-face peer groups are now found in online forums.
 - The forums are transforming the terrorist movement, recruiting ever younger members and—more prominently—women.
- This might be viewed as a “leaderless jihad,” with Internet communication providing a semblance of unity and guidance.

Terrorist Limitations

This portrait of the new terrorists suggests that the threat to the West, far from being a “clash of civilization” or a “long war,” is actually self-limiting.

- At present, al Qaeda Central cannot impose discipline on this wave of “wannabes” mainly, because it does not know who they are.
- Without this command and control, each disconnected network acts according to its own understanding and capability, with the collective actions failing to amount to any unified long-term goal or strategy.
- Without the possibility of a physical presence or ability to negotiate with its enemies, the new social movements are condemned to stay a leaderless jihad, an aspiration, but not a physical reality.
- And as for al Qaeda, without a viable and effective sanctuary, it cannot fully regroup and consolidate into a physical power.
 - In addition, hardcore al Qaeda members are dwindling in numbers and are not being replaced.

NOTE: This analysis suggests that the logical strategy to ensure national security should be one of containment while waiting for the new threat to disintegrate for internal reasons.

Counterterrorism It is crucial to show that our counterterrorism efforts are not part of a war on Islam.

- Government officials should actively challenge those who question the loyalty of Muslim Americans.
- The American Dream is alive and well among Muslim Americans; this fact should be publicized more.
- Muslim American success stories could serve as sources of inspiration and hopes for young Muslims.
- The “war of ideas” should be replaced by the inspiration of new dreams and hopes for young Muslims.

NOTE: The United States can set an example for the rest of the world, showing how domestic policies might mitigate social and economic discrimination of local immigrant communities.

Defeating the Attempted Global Jihadist Insurgency: Forty Steps for the Next President to Pursue against al Qaeda, Like-Minded Groups, Unhelpful State Actors, and Radicalized Sympathizers

Peter Bergen and Laurence Footer

Background

Since September 11, 2001, al Qaeda has attempted to morph into a popular movement—what some have called “al Qaeda 2.0.” The United States has been fighting against a global campaign of terrorism, coupled with a series of local insurgencies—an attempted global jihadist insurgency. In response, a global counterinsurgency strategy must be adopted to combat al Qaeda 2.0, and it should include the following key initiatives:

- Remove barriers to and better prepare for winning the conflict.
- Improve counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
- Eliminate safe havens in Pakistan.
- Expand counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq.
- Manage “blowback” and monitor ungoverned regions.
- Develop an Internet-based strategy to attack the jihadists.
- Start fighting the “war of ideas” like we mean it.
- Adopt a more proactive, rights-based foreign policy.
- Better secure the homeland.

The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual states that “killing insurgents—while necessary, especially with respect to extremists—by itself cannot defeat an insurgency.”

Preparation

The authors present a list of recommendations to remove barriers to and better prepare for defeating the attempted global jihadist insurgency.

- Expand U.S. military force size back to 1990 levels.
- Increase State Department assets like Foreign Service officers.
- Learn to speak their language.

- Streamline and “smart-line” the security clearance process.
 - Initiate a Manhattan Project to move away from an oil-based economy.
 - Win the battle for hearts and minds at home and improve government coordination.
 - Create an Office of Metrics to monitor public opinion, democracy-promotion, nation-building, and terrorism.
- Afghanistan* The authors present a list of recommendations on what to do in Afghanistan.
- Counter the insurgency instead of just killing terrorists and insurgents.
 - Increase local and allied force sizes.
 - Expand reconstruction.
 - Fix the broken drug policy.
- Pakistan* The authors present a list of recommendations on what to do in Pakistan.
- Aid Pakistan’s efforts to wage an effective counterinsurgency.
 - Transform Pakistan’s tribal belt.
 - Redouble efforts to find bin Laden.
- Iraq* The authors present a list of recommendations on what to do in Iraq.
- Expand the counterinsurgency plan instituted by General Petraeus.
 - Increase local and allied force sizes.
 - Expand reconstruction.
- “Blowback”* The authors present a list of recommendations on how to manage “blowback” (*blowback* is a term used in the intelligence community to describe the unintended consequences of covert operations).
- Create a universal database to trace and track jihadist insurgents.
 - Work with neighbors to close down the recruiting networks.
 - Monitor ungovernable regions.
- Internet Jihad* There are more than five thousand jihadist Web sites, many of which are used to promote jihadi ideology as well as attract recruits, while online chat rooms provide safe havens on the Internet for Jihadists to communicate and organize. The authors present a list of recommendations on what to do about them:
- Take down propaganda sites and improve Internet forensics.
 - Target producers and distributors of jihadi videos such as As-Sahab.
 - Develop a number of new anti-jihadist Web sites.
 - Centralize monitoring of jihadist Web sites and provide a rapid response to postings on those sites from a “situation room.”
- War of Ideas* Some new things the United States can do are as follows:
- Restructure and increase U.S.-funded media.
 - Create a “situation room” to serve as a rapid response center from which key officials could wage the war of ideas.
 - Get American diplomats, business executives, opinion leaders, and Muslim Americans in front of the Muslim world.
- Foreign Policy* The authors present a list of recommendations for the Muslim world.
- Develop a new Marshall Plan to foster more open societies.
 - Distance ourselves from forces against free and open societies.
 - Promote equal rights for women in the Muslim world.
 - Confront Iranian intransigence with increased sanctions and isolation.

*Homeland
Security*

- Challenge Saudi radicalization.
- Protect the progress in Lebanon.
- Pull together most of the original members of the Middle East Treaty Organization.
- Reorganize and increase funding for USAID.

The authors present a list of recommendations to better secure the homeland.

- Create a joint Interagency Task Force to coordinate nonproliferation efforts by the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, Commerce, and Treasury as well as the Intelligence Community.
- Increase monitoring of industrial-strength hydrogen peroxide transfers.
- Keep radical Islam out of U.S. prisons.
- Create a national security health response system, with a reserve medical corps trained to respond to emergencies.
- Construct a network of National Security Courts to process enemy combatants and adjudicate terrorism trials.